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their Anglo-American counterparts. This paper analyses the decision to change the dividend for a panel 
of 221 German firms from 1984 to 1994. The choice of the period of study is motivated by the fact that 
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Our findings also contradict Bhattacharya’s (1979) argument that the costs of dividend changes are 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the dividend policy of German firms is more flexible than the one of 
their Anglo-American counterparts. This paper analyses the decision to change the dividend for a panel 
of 221 German firms from 1984 to 1994. The choice of the period of study is motivated by the fact that 
at the start of this period there was an economic boom which was followed by a recession. Consistent 
with the traditional dividend literature, e.g. Lintner (1956), net earnings are key determinants of the 
decision to change the dividend. However, the study comes up with two findings which are contrary to 
Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). First, the level of net earnings is not the only key 
determinant of the dividend decision, as the occurrence of a loss – whatever its magnitude – has an 
explanatory power exceeding the one of the level of the loss. Second, dividend cuts or omissions tend 
to be temporary and the majority of German firms quickly (within two years) revert to their initial 
dividend level. This stands in marked contrast with DeAngelo et al. (1992) who find that US firms are 
more likely to reduce their dividend when earnings deteriorate on a permanent basis. Furthermore, the 
fact that German firms frequently omit and cut their dividend and quickly return to their initial dividend 
suggests that dividends in Germany have less of a signalling role than dividends in the US and the UK. 
Our findings also contradict Bhattacharya’s (1979) argument that the costs of dividend changes are 
asymmetric with dividend reductions being more costly to the firm than dividend increases. Finally, we 
find evidence that firms with banks as their major shareholder are more willing to omit their dividend 
than firms controlled by other types of shareholder. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Company directors of UK firms frequently complain that they have little flexibility in 
terms of their dividend policy. The recent case of BT plc is a good illustration of this 
anecdotal inflexibility. According to the Guardian of 18 May 2001 (p.31),  ‘[…] 
British Telecom got in a mess and required a rescue financing. The City was appalled 
at the scrapping of the dividend. There were some who argued that it should have 
maintained a payout so as to protect its longer term investment grade status ...’. 
Already in 1994, the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Stephen Dorrell, argued 
that ‘dividend payouts [in the UK], which have risen substantially since 1979, may 
have become too high and inflexible’.
1 It is then surprising that in Germany, where 
anecdotal evidence suggests that dividend policy is much more flexible (see e.g. The 
Economist, 29/1/1994), some of the largest companies have been gradually adopting 
Anglo-American dividend policies. For example, Daimler-Benz AG (now 
DaimlerChrysler) announced in the mid 1990s that it was “considering changing its 
dividend policy to come into line with what the group’s finance director [Gerhard 
Liener] described as ‘Anglo-American’ practice … In the long term, Daimler-Benz 
was considering making sure that its dividend was more closely related to the group’s 
earnings”.
2 
In a Miller and Modigliani (1961) framework of perfect capital markets, dividend 
policy is irrelevant. However, as real world market frictions violate the MM-
assumptions, dividend policy may have an important impact on the firm’s value. For 
example, if managers are believed to have a better idea about the future profitability 
than outside investors, changes in the dividend policy may convey new information. 
One reason why dividend policy may have a different economic role in Germany 
compared to Anglo-American countries is that it is embedded in a different corporate 
governance system. Most German firms tend to have a large, controlling shareholder 
and the role of the stock market in the provision of financing is less pronounced 
(Barca and Becht 2001). Furthermore, large shareholders hold at least 50% of the 
board seats on the supervisory board and are assumed to monitor the management. 
Consequently, the traditional agency problems between management and shareholders 
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may be less of an issue in Germany. If this capital-market and corporate-governance 
system can be associated with lower informational and monitoring problems, then the 
need to use dividends as a signalling device may be less pronounced in Germany than 
in the US or UK where corporate ownership is more dispersed and stock markets are 
important. 
Dividend signalling is costly. Therefore, one can argue that a corporate governance 
system which requires less dividend signalling will be preferred to one that relies 
more heavily on this kind of signalling. Although, the international debate on the best 
corporate governance system has been going on for more than two decades (see 
McCahery et al. 2002), to-date little is still known about the dividend policy of firms 
operating outside the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
arguments behind the decision to change the dividend and the impact of concentrated 
shareholder control  on dividend policy. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
describes the sample of German firms. Section 4 focuses on a probit analysis of the 
decision to change the dividend. In section 5, we address the timing of dividend 
omissions and cuts. Section 6 concentrates on the speed of dividend re-initiations and 
increases (the so called dividend-rebounds) after dividend omissions and dividend 
reductions, respectively. In section 7, we study the role of corporate control in the 
dividend decision. Section 8 concludes. 
2.  Theories and empirical studies on dividend changes 
Theories on dividend changes 
Most theoretical models explaining dividend changes focus on dividend signalling 
and are based on the assumption of asymmetric information between the managers 
and outside investors. If managers have more information on the firm’s future 
prospects than outsiders, then dividend increases may convey information about 
increases in the firm’s expected value. However, dividends will only act as a credible 
signal if firms with poor prospects cannot mimic the signal of firms with good 
prospects. When do German firms change their dividends? 
  4
To be credible a signal therefore needs to be costly enough so that bad firms cannot 
use it. The costs associated with dividends vary across models. Bhattacharya (1979) 
and John and Williams (1985) argue that dividends are credible signals given that 
they are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. However, there is no such tax 
disadvantage for dividends in Germany (Amihud and Murgia, 1997). Miller and Rock 
(1985) show that net dividend increases – defined as increases in dividends minus the 
proceeds from seasoned equity issues – reveal favourable information while the cost 
of an incorrect signal is underinvestment. Ofer and Thakor  (1987) design a model in 
which share repurchases and dividends are used to signal unobserved cash flows. The 
signals are costly as they will require the firm to raise new, external equity in the 
future which is a costly process. These models agree on two points: first, that 
increases in dividends can serve as signals of improved firm value; and second, that 
dividend signalling is costly.  
Ownership may be an alternative way to signal firm value. For example, Leland and 
Pyle (1977) show that the founder can signal his company’s quality by the proportion 
of shares he retains after the initial public offering (IPO). The higher the proportion of 
shares retained by the founder the higher is the market’s expectation about the future 
value of the firm. The signal is credible as by selling fewer shares in the IPO the 
founder bears the costs of holding an undiversified portfolio. Likewise, Born (1988) 
argues that insider ownership is important when assessing dividend signals. The 
validity of the signal can be checked ex ante in the case where a proportion of the 
managers’ ownership cannot be sold until after the performance of the firm can be 
observed.
3 Hence, managers with long-term holdings will only signal if they believe 
that their shares are substantially undervalued as they will not be able to exploit the 
short-term wealth effects of false signals. The managers will suffer if the signal is 
misused, as the decline in the value of the shares that are restricted from trading may 
                                                             
3 These restrictions exist in practice. First, firms that have recently gone public may be subject to so 
called lock-in agreements which prevent the initial owners from selling additional shares during a pre-
specified period after the IPO. Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) report that, although there is 
no such legal requirement, the initial shareholders of UK IPOs often have their shares locked in until 
the publication of the next company accounts. Second, a significant number of German firms have 
dual-class shares with the non-voting shares being listed on the stock exchange and the voting shares 
being in the hands of the large shareholder. As the latter are not listed, this may restrict their trading at 
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exceed the gain from the false signal. Born’s model faces an important criticism: the 
argument that long-term shareholders (who are restricted to trade their shares) are 
concerned about the short-term value of their holding is counter-intuitive to the least.  
To summarise, theory suggests that both dividend increases and insider ownership can 
act as signals of improved firm performance. However, there is no general theory 
which clearly analyses the interactions between these two types of signal. The above 
theories provide three strong predictions. First, managers will only increase the 
dividend, if they have good reasons to believe that the future cash flows will remain 
high enough to sustain the higher dividend. Second, managers will only proceed with 
dividend decreases, if they think that future cash flows will be persistently too low to 
sustain  the present dividend levels. Third, there is a positive link between stock 
returns and the announcements of dividend changes. There is a vast number of 
empirical studies which confirm at least one of these predictions, although most of 
these studies are based on samples of US firms. 
Studies on dividend changes 
The dividend-rigidity literature has its roots in Lintner’s survey (1956) and the 
reluctance to change the dividend was corroborated by the Fama and Babiak (1968) 
study. More recently, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1992, 
1996) have documented managerial reluctance to cut and omit dividends. For 
example, DeAngelo et al. (1992) study a sample of NYSE firms with at 10 years of 
positive earnings before 1980. The sample consists of 167 firms with at least one year 
of negative earnings during the period of 1980 to 1985 and 440 firms without negative 
earnings during the same period. They find that 51 per cent of the loss-making firms 
reduce their dividend against 1 per cent of the firms without a loss. They conclude 
that a loss is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for a dividend 
reduction. Marsh (1992) finds a similar reluctance for the case of UK firms. This is 
confirmed by Edwards and Mayer (1986). The latter conduct a survey of the ‘Hundred 
Group’, an association of the largest UK companies with offices in London. They find 
that managers reduce their dividend only when they are facing a persistent decline in 
earnings.  When do German firms change their dividends? 
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Pettit (1972) is one of the first to document the positive relationship between dividend 
changes and stock returns. Conversely, Watts (1973) and Gonedes (1978) find 
conflicting evidence in the sense that the information content of dividends can be 
trivial. However, more recent studies, using more sophisticated research 
methodologies, confirm Pettit’s findings. Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and 
Mullins (1983, 1986), Healy and Palepu (1988), Kane et al. (1984), Ofer and Siegel 
(1987), and Christie (1994) have all found that US dividends convey information. For 
the UK, Marsh (1992) finds results that are very similar to the US findings both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. Amihud and Murgia (1997) conclude that the share 
price reaction to dividend news in Germany is similar to the one in the US, despite the 
fact that dividends paid by German companies do not suffer from a tax advantage as 
the ones paid by US firms. 
3.  Methodology, sample and data description 
Methodology 
We use a discrete-choice model to address the following issues. First, we test whether 
bottom line earnings and changes in earnings are the key determinants of dividend 
reductions and dividend increases. Although, Lintner (1956) argues that earnings 
should determine dividend changes, his sample consists mainly of large, profitable US 
firms which have a high propensity for dividend increases. DeAngelo et al. (1992) 
examine whether bottom line earnings also explain dividend decreases. Second, we 
analyse at what point in time German firms omit dividends as opposed to just reduce 
them. For example, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) argue that managers avoid 
dividend omissions at all costs and prefer to reduce dividends now in order to avoid 
future dividend omissions. We determine the degree of flexibility of the dividend 
policy of German firms and the importance of current changes in profitability rather 
than permanent shocks for the setting for the dividend setting. Finally, in section 7, 
we investigate the impact of large shareholders on the dividend decision.  
The decision to reduce, maintain or i ncrease the dividend is clearly an ordinal 
variable. A simple multinomial logit or probit model would fail to account for the 
ordinal nature of the variable. Likewise, the use of OLS is also not recommended as 
such a regression would treat the difference between decreasing and maintaining the When do German firms change their dividends? 
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dividend in the same way as the one between maintaining and increasing the dividend. 
To account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we use an ordered probit 
as developed by McElvey and Zaviona (1975). The model is built around a latent 
regression in the same manner as the binomial probit model.
4 The underlying model 
is: 
? ? ? ? X y
' *  (1) 
where y
* is an unobserved variable, X is a set of explanatory variables, and ? is the 
residual. The decision t o decrease takes the value 0, maintain takes the value 1 and 
increase takes the value 2. Although y
* is not observed, we observe y: 
        y = 0    if y
* ? 0, 
        y = 1    if 0 < y
* ? ? 
        y = 2    if ? ? y* 
? is an unknown parameter to be estimated with  ?. Assume that  ?  is normally 
distributed across observations (as in the binomial probit model) and the mean and the 
variance of  ? are set to zero and one, respectively.
5 With the normal distribution we 
have the following probabilities: 
        P y X ( ) ( )
' ? ? ? 0 ? ?  
        P y X X ( ) ( ) ( )
' ' ? ? ? ? ? 1 ? ? ? ? ?  
        P y X ( ) ( )
' ? ? ? ? 2 1 ? ? ?  
where ?  is the cumulative standard normal. The coefficients are estimated by using 
the maximum likelihood function.  
We estimate the dividend change-earnings model using levels of earnings and 
changes in earnings (and alternatively levels of and changes in cash flows) lagged by 
one or more periods. However, lags beyond lag 1 were neither individually nor jointly 
statistically significant. We tested the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity using a 
Lagrange Multiplier test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1984). As there was not enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, all models were estimated 





adding an additional parameter vector to the model). 
                                                             
4 See Maddala (1983, pp.46-49) for a more detailed account of this technique. 
5 As Greene (1993, p.673) puts it, the model can also be estimated with a logistically distributed 
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Sample and data description 
Our sample is a panel of data ranging from 1984 to 1993. The sample consists of 221 
quoted German industrial and commercial firms listed on the 8 German stock 
exchanges for the period 1984-93. The reason why we chose this particular 10 year-
data panel is that the first half of this period is characterised by an economic boom 
period which is followed by an economic recession. Hence, it is likely that firms will 
be under pressure to revise t heir dividend policy during this period. The sample is 
highly representative of the population of listed German firms, as it contains more 
than half the listed German companies. The sample includes all the German 
companies that were quoted on at least one of the German stock markets and that have 
at least five years of accounting data over the ten years ranging from 1984 to 1993.  
Our initial sample included 13 firms that left the stock market: 6 of them went 
bankrupt, 5 were taken over and 2 put so called ‘control agreements’ in place during 
1984-93. We excluded firms with ‘control agreements’ in place over the entire period 
1984-93. Control agreements are between a company and its parent company and are 
either Profit and Loss Agreements (PLA,  Gewinnabführungsvertrag) or a 
Subordination of Management Agreement (SMA,  Beherrschungsvertrag). For the 
latter contracts, the controlling company is required to absorb all the losses, but the 
transfer of profits is optional. In the case of a PLA, both profits and losses are always 
transferred to the parent company. The reason for excluding such firms is that their 
accounting information tends to be limited. Frequently, the profit is not disclosed and 
reporting is limited to the amount transferred to the parent company 
(Gewinnabführung) as well as the dividends paid to the minority shareholders. Thirty-
six firms were introduced on the stock exchange after 1984. All in all, there are 2,098 
firm-year observations: the panel counts ten years of observations for 174 firms, 9 for 
13 firms, 8 for 15 firms, 7 for 8 firms, 6 for 9 firms and 5 for 2 firms.  
We collect all the accounting items from the  Hoppenstedt Saling Aktienführer. 
Dividends per share  (Dt–1) are calculated as the weighted average of dividends on 
ordinary shares and on preference shares (if outstanding). The weights are based on 
the relative market capitalization of both types of shares. Forty-four of the 221 firms 
in the sample had preference shares outstanding in at least one year of our sample When do German firms change their dividends? 
  9
period. It should be noted that in 37 of these 44 cases dividends on German preference 
shares usually change along with those on the ordinary shares.  
Special dividends on ordinary shares are also included in the dividend per share. 
There were 191 such special dividend payments for the total 2,098 firm-year 
observations (i.e. 9% of the sample). A simple inspection of the dividend per share 
series reveals that in an overwhelming majority of the cases these special dividends 
frequently reflect shifts in dividend policy rather than just transitory increases in 
dividends and earnings. Brickley (1983) studies the dividend payouts and earnings of 
a sample of US firms in the year following the announcement of special dividends and 
finds results supporting this view. However, in 10 cases we observed large one-off 
payments (Sonderausschüttung) either associated with ‘special anniversaries’, or sales 
of subsidiaries (in one case), or distributions of reserves previously accumulated at a 
different rate of taxation.  Similarly to the methodology in Behm and Zimmermann 
(1993), we excluded these 10 firm-year observations. 
German accounting rules are often considered to be particularly deficient in the 
information disclosed to investors. German financial reporting tends to be more 
conservative than Anglo-American financial reporting (see Harris et al. (1994) for an 
overview of the system). In particular, there are three factors that contribute to a 
conservative bias in the published profit figure. First, there is some degree of 
prudence in asset valuation. According to the imparity principle (Imparitätsprinzip) 
unrealised losses need to be reported but not unrealised gains.  
Second, the regulation of the profit distribution, which is referred to in paragraph 150 
of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG §150) establishes a link between 
dividends and earnings. This provision requires companies to build up a legal reserve 
(gesetzliche Rücklage) from their profits in the balance sheet.  The annual profit, after 
the transfer to the legal profit reserve, is then the basis for dividend distribution. The 
provisions of AktG §58 specify that the management board ( Vorstand) and the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) can retain no more than half of the annual profits, 
unless they get the approval of the shareholders for a lower distribution. In other 
words, this provision requires companies to pay out at least 50 percent of their current 
profits as dividends. However, that is not the case for all companies as other 
requirements such as legal reserves and special provisions in the articles of When do German firms change their dividends? 
  10
association of companies mitigate the impact of AktG §58 such that the management 
board may be authorised to transfer up to 100 percent of the year’s profit to profit 
reserves. As a consequence of the link established by t he AktG §58 between 
dividends and earnings, it is in the interest of managers not to report earnings that 
attain a desired dividend policy because higher reported earnings may create 
shareholder pressure for higher dividends.   
Third, the existence of pension provisions may also account for a certain downward 
bias in the published profit figure. In the light of this conservative reporting, and other 
German company law specificities, we use an alternative measure of corporate 
profitability throughout this paper. Our profit measure ( NIt) is measured by zero 
distribution profits which adjust for the fact that the German tax system affects both 
measured profits and dividend payouts (Mayer and Alexander (1990). Given that 
dividends are taxed at a different rate than earnings retentions, corporate tax liabilities 
are sensitive to dividend payouts. In particular, in Germany, dividends are taxed at a 











where td is the tax rate on dividends, tc is the tax rate on retained profits, D are the 
dividends net of tax, D/(1-td) are the gross dividends and R are the recorded retentions 
given a dividend distribution of D. To illustrate how dividends in Germany affect the 
corporate tax liabilities, assume that a firm makes a loss. If it omits its dividend, then 
there will be no tax liability (as tc will be zero). However, if it decides to pay out a 
dividend despite its loss, then there will be a tax liability (amounting to td times the 
dividend distribution). 
We use cash flows as an alternative profit measure to adjust for the conservatism of 
German accounting practices (see above). Cash flows ( CFt) are defined as zero 
distribution profits gross of depreciation and changes in provisions. Changes in 
provisions are the changes in pension provisions (Pensionsrückstellungen) and other 
provisions  (Sonstige Rückstellungen).
6  
                                                             
6 The inclusion of pension provisions in the calculation of the cash flow deserves a comment, as in the 
UK this item does not apply. One could argue that pension provisions should be regarded as a liability 
(from the company towards the employees) and therefore it should not be treated as retentions. 
However, in our view, there is a strong case for the inclusion of changes in pension provisions in the When do German firms change their dividends? 
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The net income, cash flow, and changes in net income and cash flows are standardised 
by the book value of equity of the previous period. In the models described below, we 
also include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a loss in period t 
(NIlosst or CFlosst). 
We also collect data on corporate control (i.e. ownership of voting equity) from the 
Hoppenstedt Saling Aktienführer. The types of shareholder we distinguish are: 
families, other German firms, the German state, banks, insurers, foreign firms or 
institutions, holding firms, charitable foundations and unknown shareholders. As 
pyramids of ownership are frequent in German firms (Becht and Boehmer 2001), we 
report both first-tier control and ultimate control. A firm is widely held at the first tier, 
if it does not have a shareholder at the first tier owning more than 25% of its voting 
equity. A firm will have an ultimate controlling shareholder at the first tier if that 
shareholder is either widely held (i.e. a widely held firm, bank or insurer), or a 
shareholder of the following types: the German State, a foreign firm or institution, or 
an individual or family. Otherwise, the ultimate shareholder is at a higher tier, i.e. a 
tier with either a widely held shareholder or a shareholder from one of the above 
categories.   
4.  The decision to change the dividend 
Table 1 answers the question as to w hether the decision to increase, maintain or 
reduce dividends depends on past earnings or cash flows. Table 1 contains the results 
of the ordered probit model. The dependent variable is zero, if the dividend is cut, 1 if 
it is maintained and 2 if it increased. We estimated several specifications of the 
model. Each specification includes at least some of the following explanatory 
variables: a lagged dependent variable (dDt–1), i.e., which indicates whether there was 
a decreased dividend, an unchanged dividend or an increased dividend in period t–2 to 
t–1, the current level of net income ( NIt) or cash flow (CFt), the level of past net 
                                                                                                                                                                              
cash flow. Edwards and Fischer (1994, table 3.4, p.66) report that, for the period of 1970 to 1989, 
pension provisions accounted for around 6 percent of the internally generated funds for non-financial 
companies. The authors also argue that firms frequently have a high degree of discretion over the way 
in which pension provisions are invested. This is one reason why the bottom line profit figure may be 
so conservative in Germany. Because of this argument, we included this item in the cash flow figure. 
The item ‘other provisions’ is net of tax provisions such as deferred taxation. When do German firms change their dividends? 
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income (NIt–1) or cash flow (CFt–1) and the change in net income from period t–1 to t 
(?NIt) or cash flow (?CFt). The latter three variables were standardised by the book 
value of equity of the previous period. Finally, we test the significance of a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if there is a loss in period t (NIlosst or CFlosst). 
Panel A and panel B report the results with earnings and cash flow as the performance 
measure, respectively.  
In each of the specifications (a) to (e), the past dividend has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of having a change in the current dividend. Panels 
A and B show that there is a high probability for dividends to increase in the current 
year if dividends increased over the preceding financial year. The probability of a 
dividend increase will be higher when there are positive earnings in the current year 
(specifications (a) – (c), (e)). The same relationship holds for the specifications with 
cash flows (panel B). Provided that net earnings or cash flows are positive over the 
current year, dividends are more likely to increase if the net earnings or cash flows of 
the preceding year were negative (specification (b)). Alternative specifications were 
estimated including further lags of net income or cash flow, but these further lags 
were neither individually nor jointly statistically significant.  
The inclusion  of an earnings loss dummy/negative cash flow dummy (specifications 
(c) and (d) of panels A and B) improves the goodness of fit of the model. Firms that 
report an annual loss are therefore significantly more likely to reduce their dividend, a 
result which is consistent with DeAngelo et al. (1992). Finally, specification (d) and 
(e) show that not just earnings levels are important, but also the earnings dynamics. 
Rising net earnings or cash flows also lead to dividend increases.  
When comparing panels A and B, it seems that our cash flow measure is a weaker 
predictor (as suggested by the lower pseudo R
2) of a shift in the dividend policy than 
net income. A model, containing both current net earnings with a lagged variable and 
current cash flow, was also estimated. In line with the previous results, the 
coefficients on the cash flow variables were no longer statistically significant.  
[insert table 1 about here] 
Although, in general, the above findings corroborate Lintner’s (1956) results that 
current earnings are key determinants of the dividend decision, they are also a major When do German firms change their dividends? 
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departure from Lintner’s findings. Our results suggest that earnings losses have 
substantial predictive power over and above current net income and changes in 
current net income. However,  in turn, our own results may be subject to some 
criticism. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), a shift in the dividend policy of 
a firm with a long track record of dividend payments and appreciation in its dividends 
is likely to be interpreted as a shift in managers’ expectations about the future value of 
the firm. In other words, if managers have adopted a stable dividend policy and decide 
to shift it, this shift is likely to be interpreted as carrying more information than a shift 
by managers of a firm with less stable past dividends. As in the above analysis, we 
have included both types of firms, this may have had an effect on the estimation 
results.  
5.  The decision to omit or decrease the dividend 
A change in dividend policy will be more informative for firms with a consistent 
dividend policy. As mentioned above, we have chosen the period 1984-93 as our 
sample period, as this period can be divided into two sub-periods, the first one 
reflecting a favourable economic climate (1984-88) and the second one reflecting a 
recession (1989-93). To test the informational value of a shift in dividend policy, we 
only retain those firms with strictly positive earnings and dividends over the first 
subperiod (1984-88). This leaves us with 189 firms out of 221. We then partition the 
sample of 189 firms into two sub-samples. The first consists of the 71 firms with at 
least one annual loss during the second sub-period (1989-93). The second sub-sample 
consists of the 118 firms which continue to generate strictly positive earnings and 
dividends during 1989-93. So, both types of firms have a similar, stable dividend 
policy in the first period, but one sub-sample remains profitable in the second sub-
period whereas the other generates losses.  
Table 2 reports the frequency of  dividend cuts, omissions, increases and dividends 
maintained by sub-sample. For the loss-making firms, we report what happens to the 
dividend in the year of the first annual loss.
7 For the firms without losses, the table 
records what happens to the dividend during each of the five years of 1989-93. This 
                                                             
7 We do not record the dividend behaviour of the loss-making firms for the years after the first loss 
because we want focus on the impact of the current loss on the current dividend payout rather than on 
its impact on the long-term payout. When do German firms change their dividends? 
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gives us 568 firm-year observations. The vast majority of loss-making firms (57 firms 
or 80%) omit their dividend in the year of their first loss. Eight loss-making firms (or 
11%) cut their dividend. The total percentage of the firms cutting or omitting 
dividends amounts to 92%. This stands in marked contrast with profitable firms of 
which only 14% cut or omit their dividend (0.7% omit their dividend and 13.6% 
reduce their dividend). Hence, an annual loss (irrespective of its level) is a key 
determinant of the decision to omit the dividend. Given that we corrected for past 
dividend policy and earnings, these findings are not influenced by cumulative, past 
poor performance. 
[insert  table 2 about here] 
These results stand in stark contrast with those obtained by US studies. DeAngelo et 
al.  (1992), for instance, report significantly different results for 167 loss-making 
NYSE firms and 440 profit-making NYSE firms. Only 15 per cent of their loss-
making firms omit  their dividend. The majority of loss-making firms (51%) reduce 
their dividend. Similarly, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that for a sample of 80 
NYSE firms, managers of firms with long track records of dividends are less likely to 
cut their dividend.  
We not only test the impact of earnings losses on dividend policy, but also investigate 
whether a fall in earnings triggers dividend reductions. 178 firms experience a drop in 
earnings (including the 71 loss-making firms from table 2). Using an ordered probit 
model, we determine the extent to which a change in dividend policy can be explained 
by levels and changes in net earnings. In the models of table 3 dividend omissions are 
represented by the value 0, cuts to a positive level by 1 and maintained or increased 
dividends by 2. The independent variables are the current net earnings, changes in net 
earnings and a loss dummy which is set to one if the current net income is negative. 
The level and the change in net income are again divided by the book value of equity 
from the previous period. The main reason for dividend reductions or omission is 
earnings losses (specifications (c) to (f)). Specification f has the highest goodness of When do German firms change their dividends? 
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fit
8 and shows that both earnings reductions and earnings losses, but not net earnings 
levels, are responsible for changes in dividend policy.  
[insert  table 3 about here] 
As a robustness check of the above results, we also estimate the ordered probit 
regressions for a slightly different sample. This sample includes the 71 firms with the 
event year being the first loss-making year as well as 118 firms with an event year 
capturing the first year of a net earnings  or cash flow decline. This yielded 221 
observations, as for some firms we had two event years given that the year of the 
decline in net earnings did not coincide with the one of the decline in cash flow. The 
results (not reported) are very similar to the ones shown in table 3.  
To summarise the results so far, there is strong evidence that it is annual earnings 
losses rather than declines in earnings which trigger changes (mainly omissions) in 
dividend payments in German companies. These results are very different from what 
has been observed for the case of US and UK firms. In the UK and US, earnings 
declines trigger dividend cuts to still positive levels of dividends rather than dividend 
omissions. Thus, it seems that the dividend policy of German firms is characterised by 
a higher downward flexibility than the one of Anglo-American firms.  
If dividends convey information about the future prospects of the firm, as suggested 
by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1959), dividends would only be omitted if the 
managers were pessimistic about the future, long-term profitability of the firm. 
Therefore, we investigate whether or not dividend omissions are associated with a 
persistent decline in performance. This hypothesis is tested by running a binomial 
probit model on the sample of 71 firms with stable past dividends and positive net 
earnings and cash flows over the period 1984-88 and with losses in at least one year 
during the period 1989-93.
9 Three of the 71 firms went bankrupt two years after the 
year of the initial loss. The dependent variable takes the value of one if there is a 
dividend omission, and zero otherwise. The net earnings in year t+1 are used as a 
                                                             
8 It should be noted, however, that the pseudo R
2 does not include a penalty for increasing the number 
of exogenous variables (see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) such as the adjusted R
2 for OLS regressions. 
9 As fifteen of these firms had their initial loss-making year in 1993, data on earnings and dividends 
were collected for 1994. When do German firms change their dividends? 
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proxy for the management’s expectations of the future earnings with t representing the 
year of the first earnings loss.  
The statistical significance of the specifications in table 4 is very low. The past level 
of net earnings has no explanatory power on the decision to change the dividend. 
Only the current level of net earnings is statistically different from zero (at the 10% 
level). The negative sign of the net earnings in the year following the year of the 
initial loss suggests that in the case of dividend omissions by loss-making firms, 
future earnings will be low. However, the variable is only significantly different from 
zero at the 14 per cent level. Our results are very different from those of DeAngelo et 
al. (1992) for the US. DeAngelo et al. find that the decision to reduce the dividend 
depends strongly on the net earnings before the event year, on the current net earnings 
and on the net earnings of the year following the event year. It should be noted that 
the inclusion of future net earnings (as in our setting and in the one of DeAngelo et al. 
(1992)) might induce a serious endogeneity problem because the current dividend 
captures expectations about future earnings. If this is the case, including  NIt+1 in the 
probit model will not add any additional information. There is no easy way to solve 
this problem, apart from including analysts’ earnings forecasts. Unfortunately, this 
kind of information was not available for the period of study.  
 [insert  table 4 about here] 
To conclude, our results suggest that German firms do not hesitate to reduce their 
dividend in the case of a temporary deterioration of their earnings. However, unlike 
Healy and Palepu (1988) and DeAngelo et al (1992), we do not find evidence that 
dividend omissions only occur when managers believe that the earnings deterioration 
will persist in the future and are not just temporary. 
We also estimated the above model using cash flow instead of net earnings as the 
explanatory variable. We found that lower cash flows two years and one year before 
the initial loss-making year were associated with significantly higher odds of having a 
dividend omission. A similar effect was found for the specification containing only 
the future cash flow. However, the effects disappeared when all three cash flow 
variables were jointly included. At best, this suggests a weak correlation between 
dividend omissions and persistently bad performance. When do German firms change their dividends? 
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Our results suggest that in Germany the signalling role of dividends is much less 
pronounced than in the US or UK. First, earnings losses are the main driving factor 
for dividend reductions and omissions. Second, it seems that managers cut and omit 
dividends when earnings are depressed on a temporary basis rather than over longer 
time periods. In the light of these findings, it is interesting to determine the extent to 
which German firms revert to the dividend payouts prior to the dividend reduction or 
omission. This issue is addressed in the next section. 
6.  Dividend rebounds after dividend cuts and dividend omissions 
If German firms are more willing to reduce their dividend in the case of a temporary 
earnings problem, they may also be more prone to increase their dividend in the case 
of a temporary earnings improvement. If this were not the case, one would observe a 
decrease in the payout ratio of German firms over the long run. In this section, we 
analyse changes in dividend policy in the aftermath of dividend reductions and 
omissions. In particular, we address the following questions: (1) how many years does 
it take a firm to increase or initiate its dividend after a dividend cut or omission, 
respectively, and (2) in the case of a dividend increase or initiation, what is the 
average dividend increase or (re)initiation relative to the payout before the dividend 
cut or omission. 
In analysing the dividend behaviour surrounding dividend omissions, we first focus 
on the firms which omitted their dividend some time during 1985-91 and retain only 
those with a five-year data-window around the omission. The window starts with the 
year preceding the omission, includes event year t and ends 3 years after the omission. 
We obtain 63 observations consisting of 61 firms (out of 221) satisfying the above 
criteria; 2 of these firms omitted their dividend twice. By definition, all the firms in 
the sample paid a strictly positive dividend in year t–1. 
Table 5 shows what happens in the aftermath of a dividend omission. First, panel A 
reveals that 56% of the firms in the sample re-initiate their dividend within the two 
years after the omission with 29% re-initiating already in the year immediately after 
the omission. Second, panel B shows that during the two years after the omission the 
majority of firms revert to the dividend-payout level in place before the omission. The 
average gross dividend for the firms that re-initiate in years t+1 and t+2 is similar to When do German firms change their dividends? 
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the one paid in year t–1. Third, the results are not driven by the fact that in period t–1 
the sample firms paid a relatively low dividend per share, as their gross dividend in t–
1 is similar to the average gross dividend of DM12.30 for the panel of 221 firms 
during the 1984-93 period. 
[insert  table 5 about here] 
We also study the dividend behaviour in the years surrounding dividend cuts (to a 
still-positive level). Our  sample consists of 62 firms that reduced their dividend 
during the period 1985-91 and had data available over a five-year window 
surrounding the dividend cut and starting with the year prior to the cut.
10 Table 6 
confirms the rapid rebound after dividend cuts. Panel A reports that 76% of the 
sample increases dividends during the two years following the cut with 50% doing so 
in the first year after the reduction. Panel B confirms that dividends revert to about the 
same level as that of t–1 over the 2 years after the cut. 
[insert  table 6 about here] 
7. Ownership structures and the dividend decision 
The analysis in sections 4 and 5 has shown that annual net earnings losses in firms 
with a track record of good past performance and stable dividend payout policies 
cause dividend omissions in 80 per cent of the cases in the year of the loss. In 
addition, dividend omissions were weakly correlated with higher and more persistent 
earnings problems, such that it seems that dividends play a weaker role as signalling 
devices in Germany than in the US and UK.  
It may well be that there is less need for dividends to reveal information to the 
markets given that the average listed German firm is closely held. Large shareholders 
control at least half of the board seats of the supervisory board
11 and hence have every 
                                                             
10 The sample excludes 8 cases of reduction in ‘specially designated dividends’ which had been paid in 
year t–1.  
11 In Germany, supervisory board representation of shareholders and employees is enshrined in 
corporate law. In companies with more than 500 but fewer than 2000 employees, two thirds of the 
supervisory board consists of shareholder representatives with the remainder of board seats being 
reserved for labour representatives. In larger firms with more than 2000 employees, a system of quasi-
parity co-determination exists as employee representatives make up half of the supervisory board but When do German firms change their dividends? 
  19
opportunity to be well-informed about the future prospects of the firm. They may 
therefore not require the costly signal of dividend changes. Moreover, banks also tend 
to be well-informed as German firms usually have a Hausbank. Such banks not only 
hold superior information as major creditors but also hold a large proportion of voting 
rights via proxy votes for the individual shareholders who have deposited voting 
shares with the bank ( Depotstimmrecht). As a result of  the presence of large 
shareholders and the importance of banks, a change in dividend policy may just 
reflect temporary deterioration in performance and not a permanent change in net 
earnings. Thus, in the presence of large-shareholder monitoring there may  be less 
need for dividend signalling.  
Table 7 documents the control structure for our sample for the starting year, the 
middle year and the last year of the sample period (1984, 1989 and 1993, 
respectively). At the first tier, less than 16 % of the firms are widely-held (do not have 
a shareholder controlling at least 25 per cent of the voting equity). Families and other 
German firms are the most important types of shareholder (panels A-C). Each of these 
categories of shareholders is the major shareholder in about a quarter of the firms. At 
the ultimate level, the percentage of voting rights controlled by families has risen at 
the expense of industrial firms. Except for a decline in the importance of ownership 
by banks, the table shows that over the period 1984-1993 control has hardly changed. 
Goergen (1998) documents a similar decline of the importance of German banks as 
equity holders in initial public offerings.  
[insert table 7 about here] 
Using the control data from table 7, we create a set of dummy variables, WH1i and 
WH2i, which are equal to 1 if there is no shareholder with at least 25% and 50%, 
respectively, of the voting equity of firm  i, and zero otherwise. Bi, Fi, and ICi are set 
to 1 if a bank, a family or an industrial company, respectively, are the controlling 
shareholder of firm  i, holding  at least 25 per cent of the voting equity, and zero 
otherwise. We also create interactive terms with control that are set to 1 if there is an 
earnings loss in a widely-held firm, in a bank-dominated firm, in a family-controlled 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the chairman who is a shareholders representative has a casting vote in case of stale-mate (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2002). 
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firm and a firm controlled by an industrial company. All control variables measure the 
degree of ultimate control, at time t-1.  
As specified in section 4, we estimate the effect of a significant deterioration in 
performance (such as an earnings loss) on dividends after a period of strictly positive 
profits and dividends. The dependent variable of the model in table 8 equals 0 if the 
dividend is omitted, 1 if the dividend is cut to a strictly positive level and 2 if the 
dividend is increased or maintained. The sample consists of all firms with dividend 
omissions or cuts (over the period of 1989-93) which had positive earnings as well as 
a stable dividend policy over the preceding period (1984-88). 
Table 8 confirms that net earnings losses have a strong statistically significant effect 
on the decision to omit dividends. Net income levels are not significantly correlated 
with the dividend policy decision.
12 Specifications (a) to (c) indicate that control by 
banks increases the likelihood of a dividend omission in the wake of earnings losses. 
This is consistent with the fact that banks, owning directly or indirectly a large 
percentage of the voting rights, mitigate asymmetries of information and agency 
costs, and thus reduce the need for dividends as signalling and monitoring devices. 
This result is consistent with evidence for Japanese firms: Dewenter and Warther 
(1996) show that  Keiretsu firms cut and omit dividends more often than other 
Japanese firms. However, family control
13 (specifications (a), (b) and (d)) as well as 
control by other categories (not shown) do not seem to have a large impact on the 
dividend decision.  
Whereas specification (a) shows that the lack of a controlling shareholder has no 
impact on the dividend decision, specification (e) shows that firms that suffered an 
earnings loss in t-1 and have diffuse control are more reluctant to omit or cut their 
dividend. This may be due to the fact that in widely-held firms, dividend changes do 
not reflect temporary changes in earnings but longer term changes in earnings levels. 
                                                             
12 The results do not change significantly if we use changes in net earnings instead of levels of 
earnings. 
13 The dummy variable of control by corporate shareholders is excluded to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. When do German firms change their dividends? 
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Alternative specifications with variables interacting earnings losses with control by 
category of owner did not yield significant results. The control variables are 
individually and jointly insignificant, and therefore do not explain the decision to 
decrease, maintain or increase the dividend. This result is true for both the cash flow 
and the published profits model. A binary probit for the decision to omit or not to 
omit the dividend was also estimated to check our initial assumption of ordering and 
produced similar results.  
[insert table 8 about here] 
8.  Conclusion 
To date, there has been a lot of anecdotal evidence that German firms benefit from a 
more flexible dividend policy than their US or UK counterparts. This paper applies a 
discrete choice approach to the dividend decision of German firms. We analyse how 
past, current and future net earnings affect the decision to change the dividend. In 
order to adjust for the potential conservatism of German accounting practices, we also 
check whether cash flows determine the decision to change the dividend. The choice 
of the period of study (1984-1994) is motivated by the fact that at the start of this 
period there was an economic boom which was followed by a recession. 
Consistent with Lintner (1956), we find that net earnings are key determinants of the 
decision to change the dividend. However, we find evidence that contradicts the 
findings from the Anglo-American empirical literature (e.g. DeAngelo et al. 1992) 
and also contradicts the Miller and Modigliani (1961) predictions. First, we find that it 
is not the net earnings level which is a key determinant of the decision to change the 
dividend, but rather the occurrence of a loss. We observe that 80% of the loss-making 
German firms, with at least five preceding years of positive earnings and dividends, 
omit the dividend in the year of the loss. They do so irrespectively of the size of the 
loss and of the level of the past and future earnings. Second, the vast majority of 
German firms quickly revert to their initial dividend payout after the omission or cut. 
We find that in both the case of dividend omissions and the one of dividend cuts, the 
majority of the firms re-initiate the dividend within two years to revert to the initial 
dividend payout level. This finding contradicts Lintner’s (1956) and Miller and 
Modigliani’s (1961) predictions that managers will only change the dividend if they When do German firms change their dividends? 
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believe that the firm’s earnings will be permanently, and not just temporarily, 
affected. 
Our results stand in marked contrast with those of DeAngelo et al. (1992) for the US. 
They find that firms are more likely to reduce their dividend if their earnings 
problems are of a permanent nature. The fact that German firms frequently omit and 
cut  their dividend and quickly return to their initial dividend-payout policy suggests 
that dividends in Germany have less of a signalling role than dividends in the US and 
the UK. Our findings also contradict Bhattacharya’s (1979) assumption that the costs 
of dividend changes are asymmetric with dividend reductions being more costly to the 
firm than dividend increases. 
Finally, when measures of control are added to the probit model, bank control is 
associated with a higher likelihood to omit the dividend when the firm makes a loss. 
This result suggests that bank control (which depends on the voting equity the bank 
owns as well as the proxy votes) mitigates informational asymmetry and agency costs. 
However, control by other types of shareholders as well as the degree of control 
concentration do not influence the dividend decision. In widely-held loss-making 
firms we find some evidence of a reluctance to cut the dividend which suggests that in 
these firms changes in dividend policy bear more information and are more likely to 
signal future cash flow.  When do German firms change their dividends? 
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Table 1 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Decision to Decrease, Maintain or Increase 
Dividends 
The dependent variable equals zero if the dividend is cut, one if maintained and two if 
increased. The sample consists of 221 industrial and commercial firms and data cover the 
period 1984-93. The sample size is 1655 firm-year observations in all regressions. Net 
income, cash flow and the change in net income and in cash flow are standardised by the 
book value of equity of the preceding year. All models are estimated with a correction for 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity. All model specifications are significant with  p-
values<.001. Pseudo R2 follows McFadden (1974). R 2
p stands for the percentage of correct 
predictions. Standard errors are between brackets. ***, **, * s tand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the two-tailed test.  
Panel A: Dividend choice model with earnings 
  (a)    (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Const.      0.915*** 
(0.068) 
      0.942*** 
(0.074) 
    1.167*** 
(0.079) 
    1.209*** 
(0.082) 
    0.938*** 
(0.075) 
dDt-1   0.087* 
(0.049) 




   0.096** 
(0.048) 
    0.137*** 
(0.049) 
NIt      0.723*** 
(0.059) 
      0.968*** 
(0.064) 
    0.402*** 
(0.074) 
-      0.360*** 
(0.080) 
NIt-1  -       -0.554*** 
(0.083) 
-  -  - 
? NIt  -    -  -      0.659*** 
(0.073) 
    0.628*** 
(0.094) 
NIlosst  -    -    -0.844*** 
(0.142) 
  -0.891*** 
(0.134) 
- 
log-likel.  -1618.7    -1597.5  -1577.1  -1572.8  -1594.8 
Pseudo R2  4.7%    6.0%  7.2%  7.4%  6.1% 
R2
p  50.6%    50.4%  51%  51.9%  50.6% 
Panel B: Dividend choice model with cash flows 
   (a)    (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Const.       0.729***         0.871***       0.853***       0.927***       0.891*** 
   (0.071)     (0.078)   (0.078)   (0.073)   (0.080) 
dDt-1       0.194***         0.183***       0.173***       0.178***       0.188*** 
   (0.047)     (0.046)   (0.048)   (0.047)   (0.048) 
CFt       0.175***         0.551***       0.113***  -   0.011 
   (0.034)     (0.047)   (0.037)     (0.039) 
CFt-1  -        -0.499***  -  -  - 
       (0.051)       
?  CFt? -    -  -       0.580***       0.613*** 
?          (0.052)   (0.062) 
CFlosst  -    -      -0.645***  -0.270  - 
         (0.215)   (0.199)   
log-likel.  -1667.6    -1632.1  -1660.3  -1623.7  -1625 
pseudo R2  1.90%    3.90%  2.30%  4.40%  4.40% 
R2
p  49.20%    49.60%  48.50%  50.20%  49.90% 
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Table 2 
Dividend Changes for 71 Loss-making Firms and  118 Firms with Strictly Positive 
Earnings through 1989-1993. 
Both sub-samples of loss-making and profitable firms had similar stable dividend policies and strictly 
positive earnings during the period 1984-88. Dividend cuts are defined as reductions in dividends 
whereas omissions stand for 100% reductions in the dividend. For the loss-making sub-sample, we 
show the number of dividend cuts, omissions, increases and unchanged dividends in the year of the 
first earnings loss. For the firms without losses, we give the frequency of dividend cuts, omissions, 
increases and unchanged in the total number of firm-year observations during 1989 to 1993.  
    Number (percentage) of cases with dividend 










           
Loss-making 
firms 
71  8 (11.3%)  57 (80.3%)  1 (1.4%)  5 (7%) 
           
Firms without 
losses 
568  77 (13.6%)  4 (0.7%)  244 (43%)  243 (42.8%) 
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Table 3 
Ordered Probit Analysis of the Decision to Omit, Cut or Maintain/Increase 
Dividends in Loss and Non-Loss Making Firms during 1989-93 
 
The dependent variable dD equals zero if the dividend is omitted, one if the dividend is cut to a 
strictly positive level and two if the dividend is increased or maintained. The sample consists of (1) 
71 firms for which the event year corresponds to the initial year they made losses (measured over 
the period 1989-93), and (2) 107 firms for which the event year is the first year there was an 
earnings decline to strictly positive earnings (measured over 1989-93). There are therefore 178 
observations. Earnings and changes in earnings are standardised by the book value of equity for 
the previous year. All models are corrected for multiplicative heteroskedasticity. All model 
specifications are significant with p-values <.001. Pseudo R2 follows McFadden (1974). R2
p stands 
for the percentage of correct predictions. Standard errors are between brackets. ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the two-tailed test. 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) 
Const.      0.692*** 
(0.159) 
   1.175*** 
(0.153) 
   1.692*** 
(0.225) 
    1.570*** 
(0.255) 
    1.779*** 
(0.236) 
    1.686*** 
(0.255) 
NIt     0.390** 
(0.185) 
-  -    0.419* 
(0.237) 
-  0.277 
(0.250) 
?NIt  -      1.570*** 
(0.210) 
-  -     0.609*** 
(0.206) 
   0.619*** 
(0.244) 
NIlosst  -  -    -2.355*** 
(0.251) 
  -1.957*** 
(0.332) 
  -2.118*** 
(0.283) 
  -1.890*** 
(0.337) 
log-likel.  -163.7  -150.7  -116.3  -114.8  -113.5  -109.1 
pseudo R2  10.3%  17.5%  36.3%  37.1%  37.8%  40.2% 
R2
p  55.6%  62.4%  76.4%  76.4%  75.8%  76.5% 
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Table 4 
Binomial Probit Analysis of the Decision to Omit Dividends and the Persistence 
and Depth of Net Earnings Difficulties around the Year of Losses 
The dependent variable equals one if the dividend is omitted and zero otherwise. The sample 
consists of 71 firms in which the event year corresponds to the initial year in which they made 
losses over the period 1989-1993 and which experienced at five years of strictly positive earnings 
and dividend payments over the period 1984-88. Net earnings in periods t-2, t-1, t and t+1, where t 
is the year of the annual loss, are standardised by the book value of equity for the previous year. 
Standard-errors are robust to heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Pseudo-R2 follows 
McFadden (1974). R2
p stands for the percentage of correct predictions. Standard errors are between 
brackets. ***, ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, for the two-tailed test.  
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Constant        1.369*** 
(0.448) 
      1.326*** 
(0.404) 
    0.811** 
(0.415) 




NIt-2  -0.145 
(0.953) 
-  -  -  - 
NIt-1  -  -0.377 
(1.194) 
-  -       -0.185 
(1.181) 
NIt  -  -  -1.303* 
(0.791) 
-  -1.073 
(0.729) 




log-likel  -36.6  -36.6  -34.5  -35.2  -33.7 
pseudo R2  0.01%  0.01%  5.8%  3.9%  7.9% 
R2
p  78.9%  78.9%  78.9%  77.5%  78.9% 
signif. level (%)  0.880  0.915  0.074  0.096  0.124 
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Table 5 
Dividend Rebounds After Dividend Omissions 
The sample consists of 61 firms. The event year is the first year during 1985-1991 in which firms 
omitted the dividend per share. There are 63 observations as two firms omitted the dividend twice 
during the period of analysis. t stands for the first year of dividend omission after at least one year of 
strictly positive payouts. 
Panel A:  
Number (proportion) of firms re-initiating the dividend  
1 Year After t  2 Years After t  3 Years After t  > 3 Years After t 
       
18 (28.6%)  17 (27%)  6 (9.5%)  22 (34.9%) 
       
Panel B: 
Average (Median) gross dividend (DM) around t of firms re-initiating the 
dividend  
  1 Year After t  2 Years After t  3 Years After t 
t-1  10.5 (8.2)  9.4 (9.4)  13.6 (11.7) 
t  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
t+1  8.8 (8.6)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
t+2  -  10.2 (6.3)  0 (0) 
t+3  -  -  16.05 (14.85) 
 




Dividend Rebounds After Dividend Reductions 
The sample consists of 62 firms and observations. The event year is the initial year during 1985 to 
1991 in which firms reduced the dividend to a still-positive level. t stands for the first year of 
dividend reduction after at least one year of strictly positive payouts. 
Panel A: 
Number (proportion) of firms increasing the dividend 
1 Year After t  2 Years After t  ?3 Years After t 
     
31 (50%)  16 (25.8%)  15 (24.2%) 
     
Panel B: 
Average (Median) gross dividend (DM) around t of firms increasing the 
dividend 
  1 Year After t  2 Years After t 
t-1  17.6 (15.6)  18.0 (16.1) 
t  11.1 (9.4)  11.9 (10.2) 
t+1  15.9 (12.1)  11.5 (9.4) 
t+2  -  14.0 (12.1) 
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Table 7 
Control Structure of 221 Quoted German Industrial and Commercial  
Quoted Firms in 1984, 1989 and 1993 
Widely held firms are firms that do not have any shareholder holding at least 25 or 50 percent of the voting shares. The 
sample size varies over the 10-year period as some firms in our sample are not quoted during the whole period and some 
others went private or bankrupt.  
  First-Tier Control  Ultimate Control 
  ?25%  ?50%  ?25%  ?50% 
  %  NR.  %  NR.  %  NR.  %  NR. 
  Panel A: 1984 
A. Widely held  15.4  28  45.6  83  15.9  29  46.2  84 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
               
1. Family  25.8  47  19.8  36  33.0  60  24.7  45 
2. Indust./Com. Firm  25.8  47  18.7  34  11.0  20  8.2  15 
3. State  4.4  8  3.3  6  7.7  14  5.5  10 
4. Bank  12.1  22  2.7  5  15.9  29  5.5  10 
5. Insurer  0.5  1  0  0  1.1  2  0  0 
6. Foreign Firm/Inst.  6.0  11  4.9  9  8.2  15  7.1  13 
7. Holding  9.3  17  4.4  8  0  0  0  0 
8. Foundation  0.5  1  0.5  1  1.6  3  1.1  2 
9. Unknown  0  0  0  0  5.5  10  1.6  3 
Total  100  182  100  182  100  182  100  182 
  Panel B: 1989 
A. Widely held  15.8  35  41.2  91  16.3  36  41.6  92 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
               
1. Family  26.7  59  22.6  50  36.2  80  29.4  65 
2. Indust./Com. Firm  27.6  61  19.5  43  10.0  22  7.2  16 
3. State  3.6  8  3.2  7  6.3  14  5.0  11 
4. Bank  8.6  19  2.7  6  12.2  27  5.0  11 
5. Insurer  0.5  1  0  0  0.5  1  0  0 
6. Foreign Firm/Inst.  6.3  14  4.1  9  9.5  21  7.2  16 
7. Holding  9.5  21  5.4  12  0.9  2  0  0 
8. Foundation  1.4  3  1.4  3  2.7  6  1.8  4 
9. Unknown  0  0  0  0  5.4  12  2.7  6 
Total  100  221  100  221  100  221  100  221 
  Panel C: 1993 
A. Widely held  14.9  31  39.4  82  15.9  33  39.9  83 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
               
1. Family  22.1  46  16.3  34  32.7  68  25.0  52 
2. Indust./Com. Firm  33.7  70  26.4  55  12.0  25  9.6  20 
3. State  4.3  9  3.4  7  8.7  18  6.3  13 
4. Bank  7.7  16  2.4  5  10.1  21  3.8  8 
5. Insurer  1.9  4  0  0  1.9  4  0  0 
6. Foreign Firm/Inst.  5.3  11  5.3  11  10.6  22  10.6  22 
7. Holding  9.1  19  5.8  12  0.5  1  0.5  1 
8. Foundation  1.0  2  1.0  2  1.9  4  1.4  3 
9. Unknown  0  0  0  0  5.8  12  2.9  6 
Total  100  208  100  208  100  208  100  208 




Ordered Probit Analysis of the Relation Between Dividend Omissions,  
Earnings Losses and Control Structures 
The dependent variable equals zero if the dividend is omitted, one if the dividend is cut to a strictly 
positive level and two if the dividend is increased or maintained. The sample consists of (1) 71 firms 
in which the event year corresponds to the initial year they made losses over the period 1989-93, 
and (2) 107 firms in which the event year is the first year there was an earnings decline but strictly 
positive earnings during 1989-93. In addition, all sample firms have a stable dividend policy and 
positive earnings over 1984-88. We excluded firms with unavailable ownership data as well as those 
firms controlled by the state or foundations. The final sample consists of 129 observations. Earnings 
(NIit) are standardised by the book value of equity of the previous year. NILOSSit is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if there is an annual earnings loss in year t.  Bi,t-1 and  Fi,t-1 are dummy 
variables which equal 1 if a bank or a family, respectively, are the controlling shareholders of firm I 
at time t-1, and zero otherwise. WH1i,t-1 and WH2i,t-1 are dummy variables that equal 1 if there is no 
large shareholder with at least 25 or 50 per cent, respectively, of the voting shares of firm i at time t-
1, and zero otherwise. WHLOSS1i,t-1 is an interactive term of widely held at 25 percent level and 
presence of an annual earnings loss. All models are estimated with multiplicative heteroskedasticity. 
All model specifications are significant with p-values <.001. Pseudo R 2 follows McFadden (1974). 
R2
p stands for the percentage of correct predictions. Standard errors are between brackets. ***, **, * 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the two-tailed test.  
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)   
Constant     1.844*** 
(0.490) 
    2.044*** 
(0.349) 
    2.005*** 
(0.339) 
    1.673*** 
(0.229) 
    1.737*** 
(0.240) 
 











NILOSSit     -2.258*** 
(0.399) 
   -2.292*** 
(0.394) 
  -2.299*** 
(0.382) 
   -2.162*** 
(0.343) 
   -2.261*** 
(0.328) 
 
Bi,t-1  -0.794 
(0.501) 
   -0.968*** 
(0.384) 
    -0.927*** 
(0.368) 
-  -   




-  0.190 
(0.259) 
-   
WH1i,t-1  0.304 
(0.474) 
-  -  -  -0.007 
(0.386) 
 
WHLoss1i,t-1  -  -  -  -   1.027* 
(0.659) 
 
WH2i,t-1  -  -  -  -  -   
log-likel.  -86.125  -86.409  -86.453  -95.385  -90.723   
pseudo R2  35.74%  35.53%  35.50%  28.83%  32.30%   
R2
p  73.6%  73.6%  73.6%  71.3%  71.5%   
 